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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                         
No. 10-2029
                        
MIGUEL DURAN,
Appellant,
v.
WARDEN SEAN THOMAS
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-000294)
District Judge: Honorable Renée Marie Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 5, 2010
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: August 27, 2010
                             
 OPINION
                            
PER CURIAM
Appellant Miguel Duran, who was incarcerated pretrial at the Atlantic County
(New Jersey) Justice Facility, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his
detention by the Atlantic City Municipal Court on a controlled substances violation. 
      The motion was dated March 19, 2010 and the evidence of record indicates that it1
was mailed on that date.  A pro se prisoner's motion for reconsideration may be deemed
filed at the time it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.  Smith v. Evans, 853 F. 2d
155, 161 (3d Cir. 1988).  See also Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207-08 (3d Cir.
2002) (liberality of Rule 15 “is no longer applicable once judgment has been entered.  At
that stage, it is Rules 59 and 60 that govern the opening of final judgments.”).
2
Duran claimed in his petition that he was subjected to a warrantless arrest on December
26, 2009 pursuant to Complaint No. W2009-0090870/02, and detained for 14 days
without a probable cause hearing in violation of his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.  Duran sought dismissal of the charges and release from
custody.  He also claimed that the court imposed excessive bail in the amount of $85,000
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Duran later supported his habeas corpus petition
with a memorandum of law, in which he observed that his detention without a hearing
had increased to 38 days.
The District Court assumed jurisdiction over Duran’s petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1975).  In an order
entered on March 17, 2010, the court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to
exhaust state remedies and lack of extraordinary circumstances.  See id. at 443 (section
2241 jurisdiction without exhaustion at the pretrial stage should only be exercised where
extraordinary circumstances are present).  On May 4, 2010, Duran filed a post-judgment
letter/motion for leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.  1
Misunderstanding the District Court’s original decision regarding jurisdiction, Duran
3sought to amend his petition in order to seek habeas corpus relief under section 2241
rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  On April 5, 2010, Duran filed a notice of appeal.  In an
order entered on July 12, 2010, the District Court denied the post-judgment motion. 
Repeating its original reasoning, the court concluded that jurisdiction was proper under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, but Duran had not exhausted his state remedies.  Therefore, under
Moore, 515 F.2d at 443, he would have to show extraordinary circumstances and he had
not done so.  Accordingly, there was no basis for the court to change its original decision,
see Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) (purpose of motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence).
On appeal, our Clerk advised Duran that his appeal was subject to summary
affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit
argument in writing, and he has done so.  We have reviewed that submission.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(a)(4)(B)(i)
(if party files notice of appeal after court enters judgment but before it disposes of motion
for reconsideration notice becomes effective when order disposing of such motion is
entered).  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of
an appeal when it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented by the appeal. 
Our review is plenary.  United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
4question is presented by this appeal.  As explained by the District Court in its original and
subsequent opinions, section 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to any pretrial detainee who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States,”  Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
Nevertheless, that jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the
ordinary circumstance “pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal
functioning of state criminal processes.”  Id. at 445-46.  Upon careful review of the
record, we conclude that Duran’s habeas corpus petition does not present any
extraordinary circumstances and is an attempt “to litigate constitutional defenses
prematurely in federal court,” id. at 445.  
Duran has not exhausted his state remedies and he alleged nothing in his petition to
suggest that his warrantless arrest was unique.  In Moore, we held that there was nothing
in the nature of the speedy trial right to qualify it as a per se extraordinary circumstance
that warranted dispensing with the exhaustion requirement.  See id. at 446.  Similarly,
there is nothing in the nature of Duran’s warrantless arrest for a controlled substances
violation to qualify it for pre-trial, pre-exhaustion habeas corpus relief.  See generally
State v. Dolly, 605 A.2d 238, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1991) (discussing when
search of defendant’s person is valid as incident to arrest); State v. Sessions, 412 A.2d
1325, 1331 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1980) (same).
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
5dismissing Duran’s habeas corpus petition.
